


















The Role of Remittances in Migration Decision: 





Berlin, May 2007  
 
 
Opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect  








































© DIW Berlin, 2007 
DIW Berlin 
German Institute for Economic Research 
Königin-Luise-Str. 5 
14195 Berlin 
Tel. +49 (30) 897 89-0 
Fax +49 (30) 897 89-200 
http://www.diw.de 
 
ISSN print edition 1433-0210 
ISSN electronic edition 1619-4535 
 
Available for free downloading from the DIW Berlin website. The Role of Remittances in Migration Decision: Evidence from Turkish
Migration {
S »ule Akkoyunlu¤ Boriss Siliverstovsx
May 9, 2007
Abstract
In this study we analyse the impact of workers' remittances on the decision to migrate by means
of cointegration analysis. In traditional migration theories, especially in human capital models, the
decision to migrate is based upon comparison of expected future incomes in the sending and the
receiving countries adjusted for the cost of migration. By contrast, the new economics of labour
migration suggests that the migration decision is made jointly by the migrant and his family. One
important element of this theory is the role of remittances that is absent in traditional migration
theories. In this paper we test traditional migration theories against the new economics of labour
migration. The study covers the Turkish migration to Germany over the period 1964-2004. A single
cointegrating relation between the migration in°ows and the relative income ratio between Germany
and Turkey, the unemployment rates in Germany and Turkey, the trade intensity variable, and work-
ers' remittances (relative to Turkish GDP) is found. We ¯nd workers' remittances to be signi¯cant
in explaining migration both in the short- as well as in the long-run.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we analyse the role of remittances within a theoretical and empirical macro migration model.
In traditional migration theories (Hicks, 1932; Sjaastad, 1962; Harris and Todaro, 1970), the decision to
migrate is modeled as an investment in human capital and the di®erence between expected future incomes
in the home and host countries, adjusted for the cost of migration is considered to be the main motivation
to migrate. The expected future income streams in these models are conditioned on the labour market
opportunities in the sending and receiving countries. By contrast, Stark (1991) considers the decision to
migrate as a family decision rather than an individual decision within the theory of new economics of
labour migration. According to this approach the decision to migrate is made jointly by the migrant and
his family, and costs and returns are shared within self-enforcing contractual arrangements between the
two parties. One important consequence of these arrangements is the existence of remittances, an element
which is absent in traditional migration theories. Therefore, a signi¯cant coe±cient on remittances in
a migration model would suggest that the migrant and family make the location decision jointly, and
compare their income opportunities at alternative locations together. While doing this, they take into
account the amount of remittances that the family would receive.
In this paper we contribute to a better understanding of the role remittances play in migration decision.
Analysis of remittances at the theoretical as well as at the empirical level has made considerable progress
in recent years as surveyed in Rapoport and Docquier (2006).
The literature groups the e®ects of remittances into two main categories. The ¯rst group relates socio-
demographic and micro-economic determinants of motives to remit and analyses their role in the decision
to migrate at the micro level. The benchmark study is done by Lucas and Stark (1985). This study argues
that the motives to remit can be purely altruistic, may originate from self-interest or may be due to a
mutually bene¯cial agreement between the migrant and the family in the home country. The mutually
bene¯cial agreement between the migrant and the family in the home country facilitates the decision to
migrate and remittances constitute an important element in forming these arrangements. The second
group considers macroeconomic e®ects of remittances by analyzing short- and long-run separately. Thus,
remittances may have a short-run macroeconomic impact through their e®ects on prices or exchange rates
(Djajic, 1986). However, the long run implications of remittances are found to be more signi¯cant. First,
remittances impinge on households' decisions in terms of labour supply, investment, education, migration,
occupational choice, fertility etc., with potentially important aggregated e®ects. Second, remittances
may a®ect a country's long-term income inequality, (Stark et al., 1986, 1988; Taylor and Wyatt, 1996).
These studies argue that remittances actually reduced economic inequality in the origin communities and
contributed to alleviate liquidity constraints, through investments in new techniques and education, and
encouraged further migration, McKenzie and Rapoport (2004). By contrast, Chami et al. (2003) ¯nd
a negative and signi¯cant relationship between remittances and economic growth with a cross-section2
data set of 113 countries. This result is explained with the moral hazard or adverse incentive problem
that recipients use remittances as a substitute for labour income and lower their work e®ort in the home
country. However, Taylor (1999) ¯nds an empirical support for the view that remittances are a positive
factor in economic development. Therefore, the main focus of research on remittances has been so far the
determinants of motives to remit and their e®ect on inequality and economic development and growth;
and has touched slightly or indirectly on the e®ects of remittances on the decision to migrate.
Glytsos (1988), Connell and Brown (1995), Poirine (1997), Ilahi and Jafarey (1999) and van Dalen
et al. (2005) have investigated the direct theoretical and empirical e®ects of remittances on the decision to
migrate. Glytsos (1988) developed a model for the remittance determination that considers remittances
as an important endogenous variable in the family decision making process on migration. However,
empirically he only investigates the determinants of remittances for the Greek-German migration over
the period 1960-1982. Connell and Brown (1995) ¯nd that remittances are mostly used to pay debts and
the fares of subsequent migrants. Similarly, Poirine (1997) shows for the South Paci¯c that the \implicit
loan" theory explains better remittance behaviour, remittances °ows, remittance uses and therefore the
decision to migrate than the \alturistic", \self-interest" or \co-insurance" theories. Ilahi and Jafarey
(1999) ¯nd for Pakistan that international migration costs are quite substantial and beyond the ¯nancial
possibilities of the migrants' close family, requiring ¯nancing from larger kinship networks. In this model,
the family acts like a bank that ¯nances migration for some other members. The borrowers remit funds
in order to repay the loans, which are put toward more loans for other family members including the
extended family that are willing to migrate.
van Dalen et al. (2005) investigate the e®ects of remittances on emigration intentions of households in
Egypt, Morocco and Turkey. They use a large household survey conducted in the years 1996 and 1997 for
these three countries. The survey contains information on whether receipts of remittances in households
in these countries encourage or discourage emigration intentions of its members. They ¯nd that receipt of
remittances contributes to new °ows of migration. Thus, workers' remittances signal to family members
staying behind that it is worthwhile to move abroad and join the remitter. An important conclusion from
this study is that remittances contribute to new °ows of emigration and possibly in the direction of the
countries where the remitters reside. Remittances thereby strengthen the chain migration.
In this paper we investigate the e®ects of remittances on the decision to migrate for the Turkish-
German migration over the period 1964-2004. Given the studies above, to the best of our knowledge,
there is not any macro migration model that theoretically incorporates and empirically tests the e®ects
of workers' remittances for the decision to migrate. Rapoport and Docquier (2006) put this down to
the lack of long-time series data for most developing countries, a di±culty in measuring remittances and
the economic structure of developing countries such as the large informal sector, the degree of ¯nancial
development and political instability that deliver biased results. However, they also add that there is
some scope for the analysis of countries at intermediate stages of development and for which the statistical3
apparatus can be su±ciently developed such as Turkey and Mexico. We agree that given the variety of
legal and illegal transmission channels, workers' remittances is very di±cult to measure. However, we
also believe that the data we obtained from the Bundesbank represent the main trends for the Turkish
workers' remittances from Germany. In our modelling, we aim at analysing the short- as well as the long-
run e®ects of remittances on the decision to migrate, applying the most recent econometric techniques
to the longest time series data available. Additionally, in this study we deal with the nonstationarity of
the long time series macroeconomic variables. In particular, we develop a parsimonious, stable-coe±cient
time-series error correction model for migration that incoorporates remittances.
In addition to the economic variables that are typically chosen as the traditional determinants of
international migration, like host-home country income di®erential, unemployment rates in the host and
the receiving countries, we add a variable that captures the intensity of economic cooperation between
Germany and Turkey. It is approximated by the share of total trade (i.e., sum of exports and imports)
between these two countries in total trade of Turkey. Inclusion of this variable could be justi¯ed on the
grounds that the volume of trade can serve as an indicator of the level of business linkages between these
two economies as well as economic opportunities that may lower informational and adjustment costs,
level of uncertainty, and certain other prohibitive factors that are associated with the decision to migrate.
Therefore, we expect that high level of business involvement between the two countries will facilitate and
promote international labour movement. In addition, the signi¯cance of the trade °ows in the migration
equation will shed light on whether trade and migration are complements or substitutes: there is still a
lack of theoretical agreement and empirical ¯ndings are rare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section gives some background informa-
tion on Turkish migration to Germany as well as on remittances from Germany to Turkey. In Section 3 we
derive the theoretical model and discuss the empirical model. In Section 4 the econometric methodology
is described and the empirical results are presented. Section 5 summarises the ¯ndings.
2 Turkish Migration to Germany: Background
Turkish workers' remittances from Germany constitute a large share (80%) of total remittances to Turkey.
During the 1970s and 1980s total remittances reached 4% of Turkish GDP, and remittances from Germany
were 3% of Turkish GDP, (see Figure 1), ranking Turkey in the top ten largest remittance receiving
countries. [In Figure 1, log of remittances (Rt) is expressed as a ratio to Turkish GDP.]
During the period 1964-2005 Turkish workers' remittances from Germany totalled 47.5 billion Euros,
capital in°ows and foreign direct investment from Germany only summed up to 17.8 billion Euros and 4.2
billion Euros, respectively. Remittances have not only been one of the major sources of foreign exchange,
but are also a relatively stable source of foreign exchange compared ranging from 1.9 billion Euros to 0.8
billion Euros to foreign direct investment and other private capital °ows. Hence, remittances helped to4
bu®er the negative shocks to the economy such as during 1994 and 2001 economic crisis. More importantly,
remittances are directed to households and individuals, while other sources of external ¯nancing, such
as foreign aid, goes to public agencies in the receiving countries, jeopardising their e®ectiveness due to
corrupt government o±cials (Kapur, 2005).
Successive Turkish governments encouraged labour emigration starting with Turkey's ¯rst ¯ve-year
development plan (1962-1967). The ¯rst plan argued that the export of excess unskilled labour to Europe
would encourage return °ow remittances and alleviate unemployment as well as the balance of payment
di±culties in Turkey. Turkish governments have made e®orts to attract remittances through foreign
exchange deposit schemes with attractive interest rates, special import privileges, premium exchange rates
and special investment schemes for workers living abroad. In the 1960s and 1970s workers' remittances
indeed helped to overcome the de¯cit in the Turkish balance of payments. In 1974 total remittances
accounted to 90% of total Turkish exports.
The recruitment agreements shaped the initial stage of migratory °ows signi¯cantly. However, later
migratory movements have had their own dynamics and mechanisms. From 1973, with the oil crisis,
o±cial foreign employment in all western European countries including Germany came to an abrupt halt
and November 1973 was the formal end of immigration. However, only 11-14% of the immigrants in
Germany returned to their home countries in the two years that followed the 1973 crisis. This could be
explained with \the Law of Family Reuni¯cation\ which ¯rst came into e®ect in March 1974. It allowed
foreign workers to reunite with their family members. Hence, Turkish migration took the form of family
uni¯cation and migration increased in the 1970s (see Figure 1). In Figure 1, Mt represents log gross
in°ows of Turkish migrants to Germany, expressed as of a share of the home population. Additionally to
this law, guest workers' agreements, the so-called \rotation model", met with resistance from the outset
by employers who complained that they had to continously train new workers. In 1971 the residence
permit renewal was made easier. The residency status of the guest workers were strengthened and foreign
employees were allowed to bring their families. By May 1972, 40% of all the guest workers residing in
Germany bene¯ted from the residency permits.
The increase in migration since 1982 could be explained with the increase in asylum applications.
The annual average number of citizens from Turkey o±cially registered as asylum seekers increased from
about 10,000 in the early 1980s to 80,000 in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As a reaction to this, the
Bundestag (Lower House of the German Parliament) agreed to the \asylum compromise" in 1993 which
made applying for political asylum in Germany considerably more di±cult. As a result of this, the number
of applications for asylum has continuosly declined. However, in 1995 and 1996 the number of applicants
slightly increased again, but since then they stayed at low levels. In addition to regional con°icts, the
increase in asylum applications stemmed from the fact that numerous migrants had taken recourse to
this entry channel, due to restrictions on migration policies. However, one should bear in mind that the
number of o±cially accepted asylum-seekers from Turkey is relatively low compared to the number of5
applicants mentioned above.
As in Joppke (1998) argued with the stop of recruitment in 1973, the migration took the form of chain
migration that arose from family uni¯cation and asylum seeking that is contradiction to the German
no-immigration policies. Legal constraints together with moral obligations rather than the political
process toward historic Turkish immigrants can explain the continuing immigration despite explicit zero-
immigration policies since the early 1970s, see Joppke (1998).
Therefore, given the information above, in spite of the restrictive immigration policies over the period,
we can argue that migration patterns and therefore migration pressures are determined mainly by the
supply-push factors together with employment opportunities in Germany that is considered to be an
important demand-pull factor.
Thus, the economic slow-down in 1999 and the economic crisis in 2001 in Turkey, and hence widening
income di®erences between Germany and Turkey (Yft=Yht), business links Thf, together with the high
unemployment rate in Turkey (Uht) and Germany (Uft), respectively, can contribute to explain the recent
pattern of migration °ows, (Mt) in Figure 1. However, one important observation from the data is that
gross migration in°ows and remittances follow each other very closely and show similar patterns that
suggest investigating the role of remittances in the decision to migrate. 6 Here, whether the causality
runs from remittances to migration or from migration to remittances is an important concern and will be
handled in the econometric speci¯cations by means of exogeneity tests.
3 Theoretical and Empirical Model
A migrant i decides whether to migrate from his home country h to the foreign (host) country f, (mihf)
and this decision depends on the di®erence in earnings between the home and the host country, net of
the amount of remittances sent home and the migration costs. One important assumption of this model
is that the migrant makes the migration decision jointly with his family. The presence of high migration
costs in the presence of distance and imperfect capital markets are the main reasons for the self-enforcing
contractual agreements between the migrant and the family. Migration costs are especially binding for
the Turkish migrants as they are unskilled with low income and are distant from Germany. Mayda
(2007) ¯nds distance between destination and origin countries to be the most important migration cost.
However, migration costs do not only include the actual moving cost, the cost of searching for a job, the
6We have also compared the time series patterns of the stock of Turkish migrants in Germany and the net °ows of Turkish
migrants in Germany with remittances. The data show no co-movement between the stock of the Turkish population in
Germany and remittances and the net °ows of migration with remittances. This result indicates that recent migrants are
the main remitters, which might be due to the fact that earlier migrants let the families follow them and do not need to
remit as much as the recent migrants. This could also be explained with the \implicit loan theory" which says that the
recent migrants might ¯nance their cost of migration with loans from their families and remit in order to pay back these
loans.6
cost of living until a job is found and the time and money cost of obtaining a passport and visa, but also
the cost that will occur due to adverse shocks to income in destination country.
The model presented here follows closely Borjas (1987, 1999),Hatton (1995), Clark et al. (2002), P¶ eridy
(2006) and Mayda (2007), but is augmented with the role of remittances in the decision to migrate inspired
from Stark (1991). As in Glytsos (1988) we assume that a migrant decides to migrate if there is a positive
net income surplus and that the migrant would like to remit only a fraction of his income surplus.
Therefore, migration will only take place if the earnings in the host country are greater than the earnings
in the home country adjusted for the remittances and the cost of migration as given in condition 1. In
addition, an adverse shock to the income in the destination will be part of the cost of migration, and the
cost will be covered by the remittances within the period. The model therefore considers also the case
where migration is conceived as a risk-reducing familial strategy within the theory of new economics of
labour migration.
Then the equation 1 is given by:
mihf = Wif ¡ Ri ¡ Wih ¡ Cihf (1)
The wages in the home country, Wih, and the host country, Wif, depend on average wages in the
home and host countries, ®h and ®f, respectively. Ri is the remittances and has a mean ¹r and variance
¾2
r. Cihf re°ects the migration cost for individual i that is shared with the migrant's family.
We assume that Cov (Wif;Ri) > 0 and Cov (Wih;Ri) 7 0 and the other covariances to be equal to
zero.
Migration cost is given by:
Cihf = Chf (Ufh;Thf) + Ci (2)
Chf re°ects the migration costs that are the same for all individuals i who will migrate from the home
country h to the foreign (host) country f. According to the new economics of labour migration, the cost
of migration is shared with the migrant's family and hence, the unemployment rate in the destination
country can be considered as one of the components of migration costs. It is added to the theoretical
model as the di®erence between the unemployment rate abroad and at home, Ufh. The presence of
business ties between countries, expressed as the magnitude of trade Thf, can further reduce the cost of
migration. Indeed, it is suggested and found that the higher the trade °ows between two countries are the
more business ties between countries and the higher migration °ows there exist (Razin and Sadka, 1997;
Pedersen et al., 2006; P¶ eridy, 2006). In addition, the trade variable in a migration equation is included
to investigate whether trade and migration are complements or substitutes. Theoretical underpinnings
that investigate how trade a®ects international labour mobility can be found in Schi® (2006). The sign
of the trade variable will have important implications for the policy, as a policy change a®ecting trade
will result in a positive or negative change in migration °ows. For instance, trade liberalisation for the
host country may have unwanted consequences, if trade and migration are complements.7
Substituting the means of wages and remittances and equation 2 into equation 1 gives:
mihf = (®f ¡ ®h) ¡ Ri ¡ Chf (Uhf;Thf) ¡ Ci (3)
Summing up for all individuals, the expected emigration rate from country h to country f is:
Mhf = 1 ¡ ©
µ




where ®f, ®h, ¹r and ¹c are the means of the foreign wages, the home wages, remittances and the
individual-speci¯c costs, respectively. © is the standard normal distribution function and ¾Mhf is the
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This is a modi¯ed version of Roy model that is advanced ¯rst by Borjas (1987) and then others,
Hatton (1995), Borjas (1999), Clark et al. (2002), P¶ eridy (2006) and Mayda (2007).
Given the theoretical model above we will model Turkish migration to Germany as in generally
accepted functional form, Borjas (1987, 1999), Hatton (1995), Clark et al. (2002), P¶ eridy (2006) and
Mayda (2007):
lnMt = ®0 + ®1 ln(Yft=Yht) + ®2Uft + ®3Uht + ®4 lnTt + ®5 lnRt + "t (6)
where Mt denotes gross in°ows of Turkish migrants to Germany, expressed as the share of the home
population. BrÄ ucker and SchrÄ oder (2006) argue that the migration stocks, instead of the (net) migration
rate, should be used in migration estimations, as an equilibrium relationship between migration stocks
and the explanatory variables arises in the long run, while net °ows become zero. However, in this study
we use the gross migration rate as in Borjas (1987, 1999), Hatton (1995), Clark et al. (2002), Pedersen
et al. (2006), P¶ eridy (2006) and Mayda (2007), not the stock of Turkish migrants. We test the hypothesis
that the decision to migrate is made jointly by the migrant and his family, costs and returns are shared
within self-enforcing contractual arrangements between the two parties which implies that workers who
emigrate pay their debts during their ¯rst year. Over time, they bring their families to Germany, and do
not need to remit as much as the recent migrants. This implies di®erent remittance behaviour for the
stock of Turkish migrants. Therefore, we take the gross migration rate rather than stocks or net in°ows.
In addition, we have the trade intensity as an independent variable, which requires working with °ows
rather than the stock of migrants. Furthermore, the initial data analysis did not provide evidence for any
signi¯cant relationship between the stocks and the explanatory variables, especially workers' remittances.
The ln(Yft=Yht) is the log of the relative income in the host and the home countries, measured as per
capita GDP in purchasing power parity terms, capturing the pecuniary incentives to migration that results
from income di®erentials. Uft is the unemployment rate in the host country (Germany). It captures8
the migration cost as well as the employment opportunities in the destination country. The German
immigration policies becomes more restrictive during the period of high unemployment in Germany, see
Mayda and Patel (2004). Therefore, the unemployment rate in Germany represents an important demand-
pull factor of international migration that is the destination country's restrictive migration policies.
While Uht is the unemployment rate in Turkey and represents the push factor in the decision to
migrate. Therefore, the unemployment rates enter into the empirical model individually rather than as
a di®erence term.7 Tt is the proxy for intensity of economic cooperation between Turkey and Germany,
which is calculated as the log of the share of trade volume (sum of exports and imports) between these
two countries in the total trade volume of Turkey with all its trading partners. Finally, Rt is the log of
the ratio between workers' remittances and Turkish GDP. The data on workers' remittances are obtained
from Bundesbank, while the data on per capita GDP of Germany and Turkey have been obtained from the
OECD. The data on Turkish unemployment, population and trade have been gathered from the Turkish
Institute of Statistics. The data on Turkish migration and German unemployment are obtained from the
Federal Statistical O±ce in Germany.
4 The Econometric Approach
In our modelling of the Turkish migration to Germany, we follow the general-to-speci¯c approach advo-
cated in Hendry (1995). We start with an unrestricted VAR(p) model that can be transformed into the
error-correction form
¢xt = ¦xt¡1 +
p¡1 X
i=1
¡i¢xt¡i + ¹ + "t;"t » Nn(0;§) (7)
where ¹ denotes a constant drift term. In short, we ¯rst test for cointegration and subsequently impose the
implied reduced rank restrictions on the unrestricted VAR model. Then we test for the long-run exogeneity
of the system variables. The results of the weak exogeneity tests are used to build a parsimonious time
series model for migration that satisfactorily passes all diagnostic tests, displays constant coe±cients, and
possesses the ability to accurately forecast migration °ows within-sample.
The vector of variables is given by xt = (lnMt;ln(Yft=Yht);Uft;Uht;lnTt;lnRt)0. The annual data
covers the period from 1964 until 2004, see Figure 1.
In our modelling, the ¯rst step is to determine the lag length of an unrestricted VAR(p) model. At
this stage, we aim to obtain a parsimonious model, which is quite challenging given the relatively small
number of observations (T = 41) compared to the number of explanatory variables (k = 6). In Table 2 it
is shown that the VAR(1) model can adequately describe the data, as the misspeci¯cation tests report no
serious departures from the underlying model assumptions. The univariate as well as multivariate model
diagnostic tests comprise: FAR { test of no residual autocorrelation (see Godfrey (1978)); Â2
Norm { test
7This does not change the results of the estimation.9
for the normally distributed residuals (see Doornik and Hansen (1994); FHetero and FHetero¡X { White
(1980) tests for heteroscedasticity based on the original and squared regressors, and on the original and
squared regressors, and their cross-products; FARCH { Engle (1982) test of no residual autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity. The graphics, regression output, and residual diagnostic tests were all
calculated using GiveWin 2.2 and Pc-Give 10.2 (see Doornik and Hendry, 2001a,b).
Having found the adequate unrestricted model, the next step is to ¯nd the cointegration rank of
the estimated system by imposing restrictions on the unrestricted model. We use the Johansen Full
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) procedure for this purpose, Johansen (1992). Table 3 reports
on the results of the trace and ¸-max tests. Both tests indicate the presence of one cointegrating relation
in the system.
Thus we impose the cointegration rank r = 1 on the system (eq. 7) and proceed with testing for
(trend-) stationarity, long-run exclusion, and long-run weak exogeneity of the variables in our model.
The test for stationarity of the variables in the model is based on Johansen and Juselius (1992). This
is a multivariate version of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with the null hypothesis of stationarity.
Since any linear combination of I(1) variables that is I(0), or I(0) variables themselves, can form the
cointegration space, this test aims to ¯nd whether any of the variables in our model alone belong to the
cointegration space. This test has an asymptotic Â2 distribution with (k ¡ r) = 5 degrees of freedom.
The test for the long-run exclusion (Johansen and Juselius, 1992) investigates whether any of the
variables in our model can be excluded from the cointegrating vector. This test has an asymptotic Â2
distribution with r = 1 degrees of freedom. Finally, the test for the long-run weak exogeneity investigates
whether the dependent variable adjusts to the equilibrium errors represented by a cointegrating relation.
Tables 4, 5, and 6 report on the results of the tests for (trend-) stationarity and long-run exclusion
which are performed on the matrix of the long-run coe±cients, and the tests for long-run weak exogeneity
which are performed on the matrix of the adjustment coe±cients, respectively. According to the station-
arity test, the null hypothesis that each variable is either I(0), or I(0) around a linear deterministic trend,
is decisively rejected. The tests for the long-run exclusion rejects the null hypothesis that ln Mt, Uft, Uht
and Tt can be excluded from the cointegrating vector at the 1% signi¯cance level, and the variable ln Rt
at the 10% signi¯cance level. At the same time, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the relative
income variable (ln(Yft=Yht)) could be omitted from the cointegrating relationship. The likely reason for
such an outcome is that the relative income ratio °uctuated more or less around the same magnitude
in the period of investigation, see Figure 1. However, we have chosen to retain it, as there is a strong
theoretical argument for its presence in migration functions and, arguably, its persistence has been and
still is the major pulling factor behind Turkish migration to Germany given its magnitude. In addition,
it turns out that after imposing the four long-run weak exogeneity restrictions we are no longer able to
reject the null hypothesis of the long-run exclusion of the relative income variable at the 10% signi¯cance
level, as explained below.10
According to the univariate long-run weak exogeneity test results (see the upper panel of Table 6),
we can accept the null hypothesis that all but lnMt variables are individually weakly exogenous at any
conventional signi¯cance level. This result indicates that the causality runs from remittances to migration,
and not from migration to remittances. Moreover, the joint test for the long-run weak exogeneity also
con¯rms this ¯nding with the log likelihood ratio test statistic of 3.973 [p=0.553]. In order to check,
whether this result is robust to the change in the sample size, we show the value of the recursive test
statistics of the joint null hypothesis, scaled by the 1% critical value, in Figure 2. Figure 2 further supports
the hypothesis that the ¯ve variables Uft;Uht;ln(Yft=Yht);lnTt;lnRt are weakly exogenous with respect
to the long-run parameter values for all sample sizes (with one exception only). Hence, this restriction is
acceptable, in our further analysis we treat these ¯ve variables as weakly exogenous with respect to the
long-run parameters.
Imposing the long-run weak exogeneity restrictions on the ln(Yft=Yht);Uft;Uht;lnTt;lnRt variables
results in the following cointegrating vector with the corresponding standard errors reported in parentheses


















All the coe±cient estimates have the expected signs and all estimates are signi¯cantly di®erent from
zero at the conventional signi¯cance levels. The relative income, the unemployment rate in Turkey,
the trade intensity and workers' remittances contribute positively to emigration, and unemployment
in Germany contributes negatively. Thus, in the long- run, the supply as well demand factors jointly
determines migration °ows. We ¯nd a large e®ect from the trade intensity variable, as it is estimated
that a 10 percent increase in trade will increase the gross migration in°ows by 14.92 percentage points.
This is a very large e®ect, especially compared to the other studies in the literature, Pedersen et al.
(2006) and P¶ eridy (2006). This result my be related to the fact that Germany is Turkey's biggest trading
partner. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in remittances will increase the gross migration in°ows by 2.05
percentage points, a practically signi¯cant e®ect.
As shown in Johansen (1992), the long-run weak exogeneity of variables allows us to reformulate the
model (eq. 7) in terms of a conditional model, where we condition on the current and past values of the
weakly exogenous variables, and the error correction term. After removing the variables that have turned11
to be insigni¯cant, the estimated conditional model for lnMt looks as follows:
¢lnMt = 0:407
(0:073)
¢ lnRt ¡ 0:144
(0:034)









b ¾ = 0:15; R2 = 0:85; T = 41; FAR(1¡4) = 0:579 [0:874];
FARCH(1¡4) = 0:262 [0:899]; Â2
Norm(2) = 0:218 [0:897];
FHetero = 3:24 [0:954]
(9)
with the corresponding standard errors reported in parentheses below the coe±cient estimates.8
The conditional model (eq. 9) is parsimonious and at the same time the diagnostic tests show no signs
of misspeci¯cation. The error-correction term is highly signi¯cant with the expected sign. It is worth
noting that remittances and the German unemployment rate are also signi¯cant in the conditional model,
with the expected signs, and exerting dampening and promoting e®ects on the Turkish migrant in°ows
to Germany, respectively. Thus, a 10 percent increase in the change in remittances will increase the
change in gross migration °ows by 4.07 percentage points. That is a large short-run e®ect considering the
coe±cients on other short-run variables, and it is almost as large as the error-correction term. Hence, the
signi¯cance of remittances in the short- as well as in the long-run supports the view held in new economics
of labour migration that the decision to migrate is made jointly with the family rather than individually.
The positive e®ects further suggest that remittances trigger additional migration in the short- as well as
in the long-run. This is one of the predictions of the \implicit loan" theory that remittances are used as
loans for the extended family members who might like to migrate. In addition, the German unemployment
rate that is an important demand-pull factor is also signi¯cant in the short- as well as in the long -run,
indicating that the process that generates Turkish migration is determined jointly by supply-push and
demand-pull factors. Therefore, the signi¯cant e®ects from the supply side suggest that the restrictive
immigration policies are not binding for the Turkish migration °ows, but having impact only through the
German unemployment rate.
The conditional model has very good explanatory power as it can be assessed by looking at the actual
values and the regression ¯tted values as well as the regression residuals (see Figure 4). The coe±cient
estimates are well determined and exhibit remarkable stability according to the recursive Chow stability
tests, the one-step ahead residuals as well as recursively estimated coe±cients (see Figures 5 and 6).
Finally, the conditional model is able to accurately forecast gross migration in°ows to Germany over the
period 2000-2004 (see Figure 7 for the one-step ahead forecasts), and this fact is supported by the Chow
parameter constancy forecast F-test statistic which takes the value 0.420 [p=0.831].
8The dummy variable is included to avoid the failure of normality test.12
5 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate whether Turkish migration to Germany can be best explained by the tradi-
tional migration theories or the new economic of labour migration. For this reason we develop a model
for Turkish migration to Germany for the period 1964-2004 using the cointegration technique. A single
cointegrating vector is found among the gross migration in°ows and the following explanatory variables:
the relative income ratio between Germany and Turkey, the unemployment rates in Germany and Turkey,
the trade intensity variable, calculated as the share of total trade between Germany and Turkey in total
Turkish volume of trade, and the remittances as a ratio to Turkish GDP. Based on the results of the
cointegration analysis and imposed long-run weak exogeneity restrictions, a parsimonious single equation
conditional error-correction model is developed that has good in-sample explanatory power and possesses
well-de¯ned and stable coe±cients. The signi¯cance of remittances in the short- as well as in the long-run
supports the view of the new economic of migration that Turkish migration decision is taken jointly with
the migrant's family.
By including the trade variable in the empirical migration function, our study contributes to the better
understanding of the relationship between the trade intensity between countries and migration. Thus the
business linkages and networks between these two economies signi¯cantly facilitate mobility of Turkish
nationals between Turkey and Germany by relaxing ¯nancial constraints, as well as by lowering various
adjustment and informational costs that are associated with the decision to migrate. Furthermore, the
results suggest that trade and migration are complements so that any trade liberalisation will further
increase migration in°ows.
Finally, our ¯ndings suggest that workers' remittances can be an important source of ¯nancing migra-
tion and may trigger additional migration and thereby strengthen the chain migration. Remittances may
also be interpreted as an indicator for ¯nancial success of those who emigrated, which may encourage
potential emigrants to emigrate. The results are consistent with the \implicit loan" theory: high initial
migration costs that are binding for unskilled migrants with low income and low access to credit markets
encourage the development of kin networks, whereby migrant and his extended family enter into an in-
formal, but mutually bene¯cial credit contract to cover the costs of migration. However, this could lead
to further greater obligations on the part of this migrant to help extended family members to join them
overseas and hence remittances are used as loans for other family members who are willing to migrate.
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Table 2: VAR model: Univariate tests
Univariate tests
lnMt ln(Yft=Yht) Uft Uht lnTt lnRt
AR 1-2 test: F(2,32) 3.356 0.897 1.6783 1.828 0.855 3.8081
[0.048]* [0.418] [0.203] [0.177] [0.435] [0.033]*
Normality test: Â
2(2) 8.0503 1.5146 0.094 4.033 0.449 1.228
[0.018]* [0.469] [0.954] [0.133] [0.799] [0.541]
ARCH 1-1 test: F(1,32) 0.275 0.311 0.445 5.173 0.024 0.249
[0.604] [0.581] [0.510] [0.030]* [0.878] [0.621]
Hetero test: F(12,21) 0.527 1.3425 0.628 1.676 0.961 0.694
[0.874] [0.268] [0.796] [0.145] [0.512] [0.740]
Hetero-X test: F(27,6) 1.252 1.016 0.235 1.746 0.334 0.362
[0.421] [0.545] [0.996] [0.252] [0.977] [0.968]18
Table 3: VAR model: cointegration tests
Rank Trace test [Prob] Max test [Prob]
0 101.56 [0.017]* 39.81 [0.050]*
1 61.76 [0.185] 25.77 [0.346]
2 35.98 [0.402] 22.54 [0.199]
3 13.44 [0.869] 8.15 [0.887]
4 5.29 [0.777] 5.14 [0.726]
Table 4: VAR model: tests for (trend-)stationarity
lnMt ln(Yft=Yht) Uft Uht lnTt lnRt trend Â
2(v) p-value
Stationarity
. 0 0 0 0 0 31.544 [0.000]**
0 . 0 0 0 0 22.798 [0.000]**
0 0 . 0 0 0 27.974 [0.000]**
0 0 0 . 0 0 22.703 [0.000]**
0 0 0 0 . 0 31.628 [0.000]**
0 0 0 0 0 . 25.325 [0.000]**
Trend-stationarity
. 0 0 0 0 0 . 25.734 [0.000]**
0 . 0 0 0 0 . 20.407 [0.000]**
0 0 . 0 0 0 . 32.769 [0.000]**
0 0 0 . 0 0 . 27.222 [0.000]**
0 0 0 0 . 0 . 32.464 [0.000]**
0 0 0 0 0 . . 16.111 [0.0065]**
Notes: `0' denotes the zero restriction on the coe±cient of the corresponding variable,
`¢' denotes unrestricted coe±cient in the 5 £ 1 cointegration vector when testing for
the stationarity and 6 £ 1 cointegration vector when testing for trend-stationarity of
the variables.
The number of degrees of freedom v in the Â2 tests corresponds to the number of zero
restrictions imposed.19
Table 5: VAR model: tests for long-run exclusion
lnMt ln(Yft=Yht) Uft Uht lnTt lnRt Â
2(v) p-value
0 . . . . . 14.011 [0.000]**
. 0 . . . . 0.623 [0.430]
. . 0 . . . 12.936 [0.000]**
. . . 0 . . 6.708 [0.009]**
. . . . 0 . 12.143 [0.001]**
. . . . . 0 5.476 [0.019]*
Notes: `0' denotes the zero restriction on the coe±cient of the corresponding
variable, `¢' denotes unrestricted coe±cient in the 5£1 cointegration vector
when testing for the long-run exclusion of the variables.
The number of degrees of freedom v in the Â2 tests corresponds to the
number of zero restrictions imposed.
Table 6: VAR model: tests for long-run exogeneity
lnMt ln(Yft=Yht) Uft Uht lnTt lnRt Â
2(v) p-value
0 . . . . . 7.8233 [0.005]
. 0 . . . . 0.0769 [0.781]
. . 0 . . . 1.2818 [0.257]
. . . 0 . . 0.347 [0.555]
. . . . 0 . 0.003 [0.956]
. . . . . 0 0.523 [0.469]
0 0 0 0 0 3.973 [0.553]
Notes: `0' denotes the zero restriction on the adjustment coe±cient of
the corresponding variable, `¢' denotes unrestricted coe±cient in the 6£1
vector of the adjustment coe±cients.
The number of degrees of freedom v in the Â2 tests corresponds to the
number of zero restrictions imposed.20






























Figure 1: Data plots, 1963 - 2004
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Figure 2: Recursive test statistic for long-run weak exogeneity of ln(Yft=Yht), lnUft, lnUht, lnTt, lnRt,
scaled by the 1% critical value21








Figure 3: Cointegrating relation, equation (eq. 8)










Figure 4: Actual (solid line), ¯tted (dashed line), and residual values for the conditional model (eq. 9)22
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Figure 5: The recursive Chow test statistics scaled by the corresponding 1% critical values and the
one-step residuals (Res1step) for the conditional model (eq. 9)
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Figure 6: The recursively estimated coe±cient values for the conditional model (eq. 9)23
Figure7:1-step(expost)forecasts(dashedline)fortheconditionalmodel(eq.9)
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